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**Liberal commercial peace is a mask for a cult of patriarchal violence**

**Neocleous 11** (Mark Neocleous, professor of the critique of the political economy (yes that is a thing) at Brunel University, PhD in philosophy, November 2011, “’O Effeminacy! Effeminacy!’ War, Masculinity and the Myth of Liberal Peace,” *European Journal of International Relations* Volume 19 Issue 1, GENDER MODIFIED OR IN CONTEXT) gz

‘O Effeminacy! Effeminacy! Who wou’d imagine this could be the Vice of such as appear no inconsiderable Men?’ (Shaftesbury, 2001 [1732], III: 113). Such was the concern of Shaftesbury in 1732. I have been arguing that this concern permeated the political discourse of 18th-century liberalism. The reason the thinkers in question thought effeminacy a vice is because they believed that, along with associated vices such as luxury, it undermined the martial spirit. As I have shown, the extent of this concern was huge. I suggest that this is also politically telling, in a number of ways.¶ First, because it reveals the belief in the necessity for strong martial spirit and sustained military values among the thinkers in question. Indeed, the liberals in question were not merely sensitive to the tradition of thought which emphasized the creative role of war in the development of civilization and the shaping of the character of human beings, but actually believed in and perpetuated this tradition. Far from perpetual peace, what was at stake in the liberal thinking of the time was a concern with how to maintain commercial order as a realm of liberty such that the virtues of civil society did not threaten the virtues of martial power. Within this, the question of how to stop the effeminacy and luxury of civilization from overawing the masculinity of military virtue and undermining the martial nature of masculine power was paramount. One might note here that this argument reinforces the feminist claim regarding classical liberalism’s patriarchal nature, pointing as it does to the unity of the masculinity required for war and the masculinity required for citizenship (Elshtain, 1987; Lloyd, 1986: 63–76). My point is that this somewhat undermines one of the historical claims made within the liberal peace thesis, namely that the conceptual underpinning of the liberal peace lies in part in the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of commercial ~~man~~ [person] and civil society.¶ My second suggestion is that any reasonable exercise in the history of 18th-century political thought would have shown IR theorists the need to disentangle the association of economic liberalism and peace. The association itself is a product of a link first made by the more doctrinaire ‘free traders’ of the 19th century peddling the myth of a link between peace and trade (Earle, 1990: 222, 226; Howe, 2007; Winch, 1978: 104). From there, the idea of a liberal vision of peace rooted in an image of economic order very easily became a piece of received wisdom. Too many IR theorists have accepted this received wisdom uncritically and perpetuated it unthinkingly, systematically ignoring the importance which the 18th-century liberals attached to military valour and martial virtues and which suggests that the belief that key thinkers of the liberal Enlightenment valued peace above all else is a piece of political mythology of the highest order. Some years ago David Spiro (1994) challenged some of the empirical data of the liberal peace thesis and provocatively called his paper ‘The insignificance of the liberal peace’. The problem, I suggest, is not the insignificance of the thesis but its status as a modern political myth.¶ As such, my third suggestion is that as well as debunking such myths and challenging the received wisdom of IR, a critical engagement in the history of ideas supports recent attempts to radically rethink the liberal tradition. I have elsewhere argued that liberalism’s key concept is less liberty and more security. Nowhere is this clearer than in 18th-century liberal thought, which subsumed liberty under the idea of security (Neocleous, 2000, 2008). But as Michael Shapiro (1993: 15) notes, ‘security’ in the work of Smith (and, we might add, other classical liberals) is never a reference to mere ‘defence’, but also connotes an active and militaristic practice. Liberalism as a political ideology has been committed to this active militaristic practice since its inception, which is one of the reasons why liberal states as organized political powers have turned out to be so fundamentally violent.**¶** The implications of this argument therefore go beyond merely pointing out the poor engagement with the history of political thought on the part of too many IR scholars.¶ Rather, the argument lends support to a growing body of work arguing that liberalism needs to be considered less as a doctrine inherently committed to peace and much more through the ‘ferocious violence with which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organise the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves’ (Reid, 2004: 64). In the history of ideas there has been a revival of interest in what Pocock (1975) calls the Machiavellian moment, a key aspect of which is the cultivation of military virtue as part of one’s civic duty. There is a decidedly liberal version of this through the centuries. ‘There is a kind of violence within liberalism’, notes Richard Tuck, ‘in which liberty and warfare (both civil and international conflict) were bound together’ (1999: 195). A fair amount of recent work from a range of positions and with a variety of foci lends weight to this argument, and really points us towards the idea that liberalism needs to be seen less through the lens of peace and more through the lens of war (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Kochi, 2009; Losurdo, 2011; Meyer, 2008; Neocleous, 2010, 2011; Seymour, 2008; Spieker, 2011; Thorup, 2006). Far from being insignificant, the liberal peace thesis plays a crucial ideological role in masking classical liberalism’s understanding of war as the exercise of the liberal spirit.

**Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case**

**Buell 3** (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off

This securitizing logic manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis

Krause and Williams 97 (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Only a discursive focus ruptures dominant power relations**

**Bruce and Cheeseman 96** (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that **debate will be furthered only through a** long overdue **critical re-evaluation** of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; **nor should it be**, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, **in familiar language and format**, to problems they pose. **This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions **how problems are framed** by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference**. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a **three thousand year old tradition** commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly **integral** to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is **integral** to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively **exclude vital areas of political life** from analysis has **direct practical implications** for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example,

present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a **necessary prelude** to a genuine search for alternative policies. **First** comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then** specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, **we need to look not so much at contending policies** as they are made for us but at **challenging ‘the discursive process** which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### Off

Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

Violation – sanctions against Cuba includes lots of non-economic elements

OFAC, 12

Office of Foreign Assets Control; “CUBA: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA,” 1/24/2013, http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.treasury.gov%2Fresource-center%2Fsanctions%2FPrograms%2FDocuments%2Fcuba.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEF2-Q38QSzJC3pwQjYQLd1XxwsJA //bghs-ms

I. INTRODUCTION¶ The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515 (the “Regulations”), were issued by the U.S. Government on July 8, 1963, under the Trading With the Enemy Act in response to certain hostile actions by the Cuban Government. They apply to all persons (individuals and entities) subject to U.S. jurisdiction – including all U.S. citizens and permanent residents wherever located, all persons in the United States, and all branches and subsidiaries of U.S. organizations throughout the world – as well as all persons engaging in transactions that involve property in or¶ ￼otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Regulations are administered by Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). Criminal penalties violating the Regulations range up to 10 years in prison, $1,000,000 in corporate fines, and $250,000 in individual fines. Civil penalties up to $65,000 per violation may also be imposed. The Regulations require those dealing with Cuba (including traveling to Cuba) to maintain records for five years and, upon request from OFAC, to furnish information regarding such dealings.¶ General and specific licenses are available to engage in certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by the Regulations. A “general license” authorizes a particular type of transaction without the need for an application to, or further permission from, OFAC. A “specific license” authorizes specific transactions, and is issued to a specific person or persons, usually in response to an application. Types of specific licenses that OFAC frequently issues are set forth in the Regulations as statements of licensing policy.¶ The following subjects are governed by the Regulations.¶ II. WHO MAY TRAVEL TO CUBA PURSUANT TO A GENERAL LICENSE?¶ Unless authorized by a general or specific license, any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who engages in any Cuba travel-related transaction violates the Regulations and may be subject to penalties. In addition to the Regulations, a potential traveler to Cuba is advised to review the Comprehensive Guidelines for License Applications to Engage in Travel-Related Transactions Involving Cuba (the “Application Guidelines”) to determine whether proposed transactions qualify under a general license and, if not, whether the transactions might be authorized pursuant to a specific license from OFAC. The Application Guidelines are available on OFAC’s Web site at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba\_tr\_app.pdf. Only persons whose travel falls into one of the categories discussed below may be authorized to engage in transactions in connection with travel to, from, and within Cuba. Please see part III of this brochure for information on specific licenses for travel to Cuba.¶ A. Persons visiting “close relatives” who are nationals of Cuba¶ Persons visiting a “close relative” who is a national of Cuba, and persons traveling with them who share a common dwelling as a family with them, are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to visiting a close relative pursuant to ￼§ 515.561(a)(1) of the Regulations, without limitation on the frequency or duration of such travel to Cuba.¶ A “close relative” is any individual related to a person by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from that person or from a common ancestor with that person. For example, your mother’s first cousin is your close relative for purposes of the Regulations, because you are both no more than three generations removed from your great- grandparents, who are the ancestors you have in common. Similarly, your husband’s great- grandson is your close relative, because he is no more than three generations removed from your husband. However, your daughter’s father-in-law is not your close relative, because you have no common ancestor. See § 515.339.¶ Please see part III(K) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for persons visiting close relatives who are neither Cuban nationals nor U.S. Government employees assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.¶ B. Persons visiting “close relatives” who are U.S. Government employees assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana¶ Persons visiting a “close relative” who is a U.S. Government employee assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, as well as persons traveling with them who share a common dwelling as a family with them, are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to visiting a close relative pursuant to § 515.561(a)(2) of the Regulations. There is no limit on the duration or frequency of such travel to Cuba.¶ Please see part III(K) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for persons visiting close relatives who are neither Cuban nationals nor U.S. Government employees assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.¶ C. Officials of the U.S. and foreign governments and of intergovernmental organizations of which the United States is a member traveling on official business¶ U.S. and foreign government officials, and officials of intergovernmental organizations of which the United States is a member, who are traveling on official business in their official capacities are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incidental to activities in their official capacities pursuant to § 515.562 of the Regulations. This authorization does not extend, for example, to officials of the government of a state, municipality, or territory within the United States.¶ D. Journalists and support personnel¶ Journalists and supporting broadcast or technical personnel regularly employed in that capacity by a news reporting organization and traveling for journalistic activities are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to journalistic activities in Cuba pursuant to § 515.563(a) of the Regulations. Please see part III(E) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for free-lance journalists. ￼E. Full-time professionals conducting professional research or attending certain professional meetings¶ 1. Professional research. Full-time professionals are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions that are directly incident to conducting professional research in their professional areas pursuant to § 515.564(a)(1) of the Regulations, provided that their research (1) is of a noncommercial academic nature; (2) comprises a full work schedule in Cuba; (3) has a substantial likelihood of public dissemination; and (4) does not fall within certain categories listed in § 515.564(c)-(e).¶ 2. Professional meetings organized by an international professional organization. Full-time professionals are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to travel to Cuba to attend professional meetings or conferences in Cuba pursuant to § 515.564(a)(2), provided that (1) the meeting or conference is organized by an international professional organization, institution, or association that regularly sponsors meetings or conferences in other countries; (2) the organization, institution, or association sponsoring the meeting or conference is not headquartered in the United States unless it has been specifically licensed to sponsor the meeting; (3) the purpose of the meeting or conference is not the promotion of tourism in Cuba or other commercial activities involving Cuba that are inconsistent with the Regulations; and (4) the meeting or conference is not intended primarily to foster production of any biotechnological products.¶ 3. Professional meetings for commercial telecommunications transactions. Regular employees of a U.S. telecommunications services provider or of an entity duly appointed to represent such a provider are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to travel to Cuba to participate in professional meetings for the commercial marketing of, sales negotiation for, or performance under contracts for the provision of authorized telecommunications services, or the establishment of facilities to provide such services pursuant to § 515.564(a)(3), provided the travelers’ schedule of activities does not include free time, travel, or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full work schedule.¶ Please see part III(F) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for professionals conducting professional research or attending professional meetings not covered by a general license.¶ F. Faculty, staff and students of accredited U.S. graduate and undergraduate degree-granting academic institutions¶ Pursuant to § 515.565(a) of the Regulations, the faculty, staff and students of accredited U.S. graduate and undergraduate degree-granting academic institutions are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions that are directly incident to:¶ 1. Participation in a structured educational program in Cuba as part of a course offered for credit by a sponsoring U.S. academic institution. Note that a student traveling under this general ￼license must currently be enrolled in an accredited U.S. graduate or undergraduate degree program and the study in Cuba must be accepted for credit toward that degree.¶ 2. Noncommercial academic research in Cuba specifically related to Cuba for the purpose of obtaining a graduate degree. Note that a student traveling under this general license must currently be enrolled in an accredited U.S. graduate degree program and the study in Cuba must be accepted for credit toward that degree.¶ 3. Participation in a formal course of study at a Cuban academic institution, provided that the student is currently enrolled in an accredited U.S. graduate or undergraduate degree program and that the formal course of study in Cuba will be accepted for credit toward the student’s graduate or undergraduate degree.¶ 4. Teaching at a Cuban academic institution by an individual regularly employed in a teaching capacity at a sponsoring U.S. academic institution. The teaching activities must be related to an academic program at the Cuban institution and the duration of the teaching must be no shorter than 10 weeks.¶ 5. Sponsorship, including the payment of a stipend or salary, of a Cuban scholar to teach or engage in other scholarly activity at a sponsoring U.S. academic institution. (Such earnings may be remitted to Cuba as provided in § 515.570 or carried by the returning Cuban scholar as provided in § 515.560(d)(3).)¶ 6. The organization of the five activities listed immediately above by members of the faculty and staff of the sponsoring U.S. academic institution.¶ A student currently enrolled in a graduate or undergraduate degree program at any accredited U.S. academic institution may travel under this general license through any sponsoring U.S. academic institution, not only through the institution at which the student is pursuing a degree. An individual traveling to Cuba pursuant to § 515.565(a) must carry a letter on official letterhead, signed by a designated representative of the sponsoring U.S. academic institution, stating the basis for the travel.¶ Please see part III(A) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for persons participating in educational activities not covered by a general license.¶ G. Members and staff of U.S. religious organizations¶ Pursuant to § 515.566(a) of the Regulations, members and staff of U.S. religious organizations are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to religious activities in Cuba under the auspices of the organization. Travel- related transactions must be for the purpose of engaging in a full-time program of religious activities while in Cuba.¶ All individuals traveling pursuant to § 515.566(a) must carry a letter on official letterhead, signed by a designated representative of the religious organization, confirming that they are members or¶ ￼staff of the organization and traveling to Cuba to engage in religious activities under the auspices of the organization.¶ Please see part III(B) of this brochure for information on specific licenses for persons participating in religious activities not covered by a general license.¶ H. Employees of a U.S. telecommunications services provider or of an entity representing such a provider¶ Regular employees of a U.S. telecommunications services provider or of an entity duly appointed to represent such a provider may travel to Cuba under two separate general licenses, provided the travelers’ schedule of activities does not include free time, travel, or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full work schedule.¶ 1. Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to participation in professional meetings for the commercial marketing of, sales negotiation for, or performance under contracts for the provision of authorized telecommunications services, or the establishment of facilities to provide such services, are authorized pursuant to § 515.564(a)(3) of the Regulations.¶ 2. Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions that are directly incident to the commercial marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing in Cuba of telecommunications-related items that have been authorized for commercial export or re- export to Cuba by the Department of Commerce are authorized pursuant to § 515.533(f). Travelers under this provision must notify OFAC in writing prior to travel and meet certain other requirements.¶ I. Employees of a producer or distributor of certain agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices or of an entity representing such a producer or distributor¶ Pursuant to § 515.533(e) of the Regulations, regular employees of a producer or distributor of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices or of an entity duly appointed to represent such a producer or distributor are authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to the commercial marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing in Cuba of such items. The items for export must appear consistent with the export or re-export licensing policy of the Department of Commerce, the traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time, travel, or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full work schedule, and travelers must notify OFAC in writing prior to travel.¶ III. WHO MAY TRAVEL TO CUBA PURSUANT TO A SPECIFIC LICENSE?¶ On a case-by-case basis OFAC considers applications for specific licenses to authorize Cuba travel-related transactions not covered by a general license but consistent with one of the categories of specific licenses listed in § 515.560(a) of the Regulations and described below. ￼Please refer to the Application Guidelines to determine whether you may be eligible for a specific license. Applications for a specific license must be submitted to OFAC either in letter format or using OFAC’s automated application form, which is available on OFAC’s Web site at https://cubatravel.ofac.treas.gov. Applicants must address the criteria set forth in the relevant section of the Application Guidelines. Applications that are mailed should be addressed to the Licensing Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20220.¶ A. Persons participating in educational activities not covered by a general license¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to educational activities not covered by a general license, including:¶ 1. An individual’s noncommercial academic research in Cuba, participation in a formal course of study at a Cuban academic institution, or teaching at a Cuban academic institution that is not authorized by a general license.¶ 2. People-to-people educational exchanges. These are educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program that take place under the auspices of an organization that sponsors and organizes programs to promote people-to-people contact. Under this policy, the license is issued to the organization that is running the people-to-people programs.¶ 3. Sponsorship or co-sponsorship by an accredited U.S. graduate or undergraduate degree- granting academic institution of academic seminars, conferences, and workshops related to Cuba or global issues involving Cuba and attendance at such events by faculty, staff, and students of the licensed institution.¶ Please see § 515.565(b) of the Regulations.¶ B. Persons participating in religious activities not covered by a general license¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to religious activities not covered by a general license. Please see § 515.566(b) of the Regulations.¶ C. Persons providing support for the Cuban people¶ Specific licenses may be issued authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions intended to provide support for the Cuban people, such as activities of recognized human rights organizations. Please see § 515.574 of the Regulations.¶ ￼D. Persons participating in humanitarian projects¶ Specific licenses may be issued authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to certain humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that are designed to directly benefit the Cuban people. Please see § 515.575 of the Regulations.¶ E. Free-lance journalists¶ Specific licenses may be issued authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to journalistic activities in Cuba for a free-lance journalistic project, provided certain conditions are met. Please see § 515.563(b) of the Regulations.¶ F. Persons participating in professional research or professional meetings not covered by a general license¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to professional research and professional meetings that do not qualify for a general license. Please see § 515.564(b) of the Regulations.¶ G. Persons participating in public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic or other competitions, or exhibitions¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to participation by amateur or semi-professional athletes or athletic teams in athletic competitions in Cuba held under the auspices of the international sports federation for the relevant sport. To qualify, U.S. participants must be selected by the relevant U.S. sports federation and the athletic competition in Cuba must be open for attendance and, in relevant situations, participation by the Cuban public. Please see § 515.567(a) of the Regulations.¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions directly incident to participation in a public performance, clinic, workshop, athletic competition (other than those described above), non-athletic competition, or exhibition in Cuba. Such events must be open for attendance and, in relevant situations, participation by the Cuban public; all U.S. profits from such events after costs must be donated to an independent nongovernmental organization in Cuba or a U.S.-based charity, with the objective, to the extent possible, of promoting people-to-people contact or otherwise benefiting the Cuban people. Any clinics or workshops in Cuba must be organized and run, at least in part, by the licensee. Please see § 515.567(b).¶ H. Persons participating in activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and such additional transactions as are directly incident to activities by private foundations or research or educational institutes that have an established interest in international relations to collect information related to Cuba for noncommercial purposes. Please see § 515.576 of the Regulations.¶ ￼I. Persons participating in activities related to the exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions for purposes related to the exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials as defined in § 515.332 of the Regulations. Please see § 515.545.¶ J. Persons participating in activities incident to exports to Cuba not covered by a general license¶ For export-related travel to Cuba not covered by a general license, OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to the marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing in Cuba of exports that appear consistent with the export or re-export licensing policy of the Department of Commerce. Please see § 515.533(g) of the Regulations.¶ K. Persons visiting “close relatives” who are neither Cuban nationals nor U.S. Government employees assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses authorizing Cuba travel-related transactions and additional transactions directly incident to visiting a “close relative” in Cuba who is neither a Cuban national nor a U.S. Government employee assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Please see¶ § 515.561(b) of the Regulations and § 515.339 for the definition of “close relative.”¶ IV. WHAT CUBA-RELATED TRAVEL TRANSACTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED BY OFAC LICENSES?¶ A. Generally¶ Persons authorized to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions are allowed to engage in all transportation-related transactions ordinarily incident to travel to and from Cuba without any expenditure limitations. Authorized travelers also may engage in all transactions ordinarily incident to travel anywhere within Cuba, such as hotel accommodations, meals, local transportation, and goods personally used by the traveler in Cuba, provided that the total for such expenses does not exceed the Department of State’s Per Diem Rate Allowance for Havana, Cuba, in effect during the period that the travel takes place. The current per diem rate is available on the Department of State’s Web site at aoprals.state.gov/web920/per\_diem.asp. Please see¶ § 515.560(c) of the Regulations.¶ Most authorized travelers may also spend additional money for transactions directly incident to the activities for which they are authorized to travel to Cuba. Please see the specific Regulation provisions for details; if a specific license is required for the travel, this additional authorization will be included in the license if it is applicable. For example, journalists traveling in Cuba under the general license for journalistic activities may spend money over and above the current per ￼diem rate for other costs that are directly incident to covering a story in Cuba (a journalistic activity). Purchases of services unrelated to travel or a licensed activity, such as elective medical services, are prohibited. The purchase of publications, recorded music, and other informational materials (as defined in § 515.332) is not restricted, nor are expenditures associated with the use of telecommunications services.¶ B. Vessels used for travel¶ All persons onboard vessels that travel to Cuba, including the vessel operator, crew, and passengers, must be authorized by OFAC. Vessels carrying passengers to or from Cuba (including from or to a third country) are prohibited from entering a U.S. port with such passengers on board without authorization from OFAC. Please see § 515.207(b) of the Regulations. Vessels traveling to Cuba are also subject to regulations implemented by the Department of Commerce and the United States Coast Guard. Please see 15 CFR Parts 730 et seq. and 33 CFR § 107.200 et seq., respectively, for more information.¶ Please see part VII(C) of this brochure for information on vessels engaged in trade with Cuba.¶ C. Travel Service Providers¶ Any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who provides services akin to those of a travel agent with respect to Cuba (for example, arranging travel to, from, or within Cuba, selling tickets for flights to Cuba, or reserving and selling accommodations for authorized travelers within Cuba) must be specifically licensed by OFAC as a Travel Service Provider. Please see § 515.572(a)(1) of the Regulations. An authorized traveler should not use any travel agent or tour operator in the United States that is not a licensed Travel Service Provider. A list of authorized Travel Service Providers is available on OFAC’s Web site at www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba\_tsp.pdf. Persons interested in being licensed as a Travel Service Provider, should consult § 515.572(a)(1) and Circular 2006, which is available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/circ2006.pdf, for details on the Service Provider Program requirements.¶ D. Carrier Service Providers¶ Any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who wishes to provide transportation services between the United States and Cuba must be specifically licensed as a Carrier Service Provider. Please see¶ § 515.572(a)(2) of the Regulations. A list of authorized Carrier Service Providers is available on OFAC’s Web site at www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba\_tsp.pdf. Persons interested in being licensed as a Carrier Service Provider, should consult § 515.572(a)(2) and Circular 2006, which is available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/circ2006.pdf, for details on the Service Provider Program requirements.¶ V. WHAT CAN BE BROUGHT BACK FROM CUBA?¶ No goods of Cuban origin, other than information or informational materials, may be transported out of Cuba or brought into the United States. There are no limits on the import or export of informational materials. Such materials – including books, films, posters, photographs, CDs – are statutorily exempt from the prohibitions of the Regulations and may be purchased, sold, and transported freely. Blank tapes, CDs, and other media are not considered informational materials. Please see §§ 515.206(a) and 515.332 of the Regulations.¶ VI. SENDING OR CARRYING MONEY TO CUBA: REMITTANCES¶ Certain remittances to Cuban nationals are authorized pursuant to § 515.570 of the Regulations.¶ An authorized traveler may carry to Cuba up to $3,000 in remittances authorized by § 515.570(a)- (d), as described below, pursuant to § 515.560(c)(4)(i). A national of Cuba departing the United States may carry back up to $3,000 received as remittances for him or herself pursuant to¶ § 515.560(d)(2). The Regulations do not limit the amount of emigration-related remittances (see § 515.570(e)) that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba, but none may be carried until a visa has been issued to each payee and the traveler can provide the visa recipient’s full name, date of birth, visa number, and visa date. Please see § 515.560(c)(4)(ii).¶ Carrying remittances to Cuba on behalf of other remitters is prohibited.¶ A. Family remittances¶ Individual persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are 18 years of age or older are authorized to send remittances to a “close relative” who is a Cuban national, whether in Cuba or in a third country. Please see § 515.339 of the Regulations for the definition of “close relative.” No family remittances may be sent to a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party as defined in §§ 515.337 and 515.338, respectively. There is no limit on the amount of family remittances or the frequency with which they may be sent. Please see § 515.570(a).¶ B. Periodic $500 remittances¶ Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to make periodic remittances of up to $500 to any Cuban nationals, including, but not limited to, remittances to support the development of private businesses. A remitter’s total remittances to any one Cuban national may not exceed $500 in any consecutive three-month period, and the remitter, if an individual, must be 18 years of age or older. No periodic $500 remittances may be sent to a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party. Please see § 515.570(b) of the Regulations.¶ C. Remittances to religious organizations in Cuba¶ Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to make unlimited remittances to religious organizations in Cuba in support of religious activities. The remitter, if an individual, must be 18 years of age or older. Please see § 570(c) of the Regulations.¶ ￼D. Remittances to students in Cuba pursuant to an educational license¶ Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are 18 years of age or older are authorized to make remittances to close relatives who are students engaging in authorized educational travel in Cuba. The remittances must be for the purpose of funding transactions authorized by the license under which a student is traveling. Please see § 515.570(d) of the Regulations and § 515.339 for the definition of “close relative.”¶ E. Emigration-related remittances¶ Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to send two separate one-time remittances per Cuban national payee to enable the payee to emigrate from Cuba to the United States. One remittance of no more than $1,000 per payee, for the purpose of covering the payee’s preliminary emigration expenses, may be sent before the payee has received a valid visa from the Department of State or other approved U.S. immigration documents.¶ Up to an additional $1,000 per payee, for the purpose of enabling the payee to emigrate from Cuba to the United States, may be sent after the Cuban national has received a visa or other approved U.S. immigration documents. At the time such a remittance is sent, the remitter must be able to provide the visa recipient’s full name, date of birth, visa number, and visa date of issuance. Please see § 515.570(e) of the Regulations.¶ F. Remittances from blocked accounts¶ Pursuant to § 515.570(f) of the Regulations, funds deposited in a blocked account in a banking institution in the United States held in the name of, or in which the beneficial interest is held by, a national of Cuba as a result of a valid testamentary disposition, intestate succession, or payment from a life insurance policy or annuity contract triggered by the death of the policy or contract holder may be remitted to that Cuban national provided that she or he is a “close relative” of the decedent. Please see § 515.339 for the definition of “close relative.” Such inherited blocked funds may also be remitted as emigration-related remittances in accordance with § 515.570(e) whether or not the Cuban national recipient is a “close relative” of the decedent.¶ Up to $300 in any consecutive three-month period also may be sent from any blocked account in a banking institution in the United States to a Cuban national in a third country who is an individual in whose name, or for whose beneficial interest, the account is held.¶ G. Specific licenses for certain remittances¶ Pursuant to § 515.570(g) of the Regulations, OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis authorizing remittances:¶ 1. To independent non-governmental entities in Cuba, including but not limited to pro- democracy groups and civil society groups, and to members of such groups or organizations, or to individuals or independent non-governmental entities to support the development of ￼private businesses, including small farms, in excess of the $500 per quarter authorized by the general license in § 515.570(b);¶ 2. From a blocked account to a Cuban national in excess of the $300 per consecutive three- month period authorized by the general license in § 515.570(f)(2); or¶ 3. To a person in Cuba, directly or indirectly, for transactions to facilitate non-immigrant travel by an individual in Cuba to the United States under circumstances where humanitarian need is demonstrated, including but not limited to illness or other medical emergency, in excess of the $500 per quarter authorized by the general license in § 515.570(b).¶ H. Remittance forwarders¶ Any persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction other than depository institutions, as defined in § 515.333 of the Regulations, who provide services in connection with the collection or forwarding of authorized remittances must be specifically licensed as Remittance Forwarders pursuant to¶ § 515.572(c). OFAC maintains a current list of authorized Remittance Forwarders (other than depository institutions), Travel Service Providers, and Carrier Service Providers on its Web site at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba\_tsp.pdf.¶ Depository institutions, as defined in § 515.333, are authorized as Remittance Forwarders pursuant to § 515.572(a)(3) to collect and forward authorized remittances to Cuba. To facilitate this, depository institutions are permitted to set up testing arrangements and exchange authenticator keys with Cuban financial institutions. Depository institutions may not, however, open or use direct correspondent accounts with Cuban financial institutions.¶ For details on the Service Provider Program requirements, please consult Circular 2006, which is available on OFAC’s Web site at www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/circ2006.pdf. All authorized Remittance Forwarders (including depository institutions) must collect information from the persons who use their services showing compliance with remittance provisions and must retain the information for five years. All specifically authorized Remittance Forwarders must report to OFAC annually on the transactions undertaken pursuant to their licenses.¶ VII. GENERAL PROHIBITIONS ON EXPORTS, IMPORTS, AND CERTAIN OTHER TRANSACTIONS¶ A. Transactions involving property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest¶ The Regulations prohibit any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in any property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has or has had any interest. Under the Regulations, “property” is very broadly defined and includes such things as contracts and services. For example, unless authorized, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction (including U.S. overseas subsidiaries) may not purchase Cuban cigars in third countries; may not sign a contract with a foreign firm if the contract terms include Cuba-related provisions, even if those provisions are contingent upon the lifting of the embargo; and may not provide accounting, marketing, sales, or insurance services to a Cuban company or to a foreign company with respect to the foreign company’s Cuba-related business.¶ B. Exporting to Cuba¶ Exporting to Cuba requires dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest. Thus, with certain exceptions, no products, technology, or services may be exported from the United States to Cuba or a Cuban national, either directly or through third countries, such as Canada or Mexico, without a license from OFAC. This prohibition includes dealing in or assisting with the sale of goods or commodities to Cuba, even if done entirely offshore. Such brokering is considered to be dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest and is therefore prohibited. Exceptions to the general prohibition include the following, with limitations: publications and other informational materials (such as compact disks and artwork) (see¶ § 515.206(a) of the Regulations), donated food (see § 515.206(b)), goods licensed for export or re-export by the Department of Commerce (such as medicine and medical devices, food, agricultural commodities, and gift parcels) (see § 515.533), generally licensed legal services (see § 515.512), generally licensed telecommunications services (see § 515.542), and generally licensed services incident to Internet-based communications (see § 515.578).¶ Pursuant to § 515.533, all transactions ordinarily incident to the exportation of items from the United States to Cuba, or the reexportation of 100% U.S.-origin items from a third country to Cuba, are generally authorized, provided the export is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce and that certain payment and financing terms are used. Pursuant to provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (the “CDA”) and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, the Department of Commerce maintains a favorable licensing policy with respect to the sale and export or re-export of medicine and medical devices, food, and agricultural commodities to Cuba. Those interested in engaging in such exports or re- exports must first obtain authorization from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. All licensed sales must be financed either by “payment of cash in advance,” as defined in § 515.533(a)(2)(i)(A), or by third-country banks that are not U.S. persons or Government of Cuba entities. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks, however, are not prohibited from directly financing licensed sales of agricultural products. All U.S. banks may advise or confirm any of the transactions authorized pursuant to § 515.533(a). Transactions incident to the donation of food to independent non-governmental organizations or individuals in Cuba are not prohibited.¶ In the mid-1970s, § 515.559 was added to the Regulations to publicize the U.S. government policy at the time of licensing foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to conduct trade in foreign- produced commodities with Cuba so long as several specific criteria were met. In 1992, however, the CDA prohibited the issuance of licenses for transactions described in § 515.559, except for exports of medicines, medical supplies, and certain telecommunications equipment. Accordingly, OFAC licenses foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to conduct trade in foreign-produced commodities with Cuba only in limited circumstances. ￼C. Vessels engaged in trade with Cuba¶ Pursuant to the CDA and § 515.207 of the Regulations, no vessel carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba, or carrying goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any interest, may enter a U.S. port without authorization from OFAC. This prohibition applies to vessels seeking to enter a U.S. port only to take on fuel and supplies (bunker), whether from U.S. fuel providers within the port limits or at offshore points, as well as to vessels discharging or loading merchandise offshore, by lighter or otherwise. In addition, absent a license from OFAC, vessels that enter a port or place in Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or services are prohibited from entering a U.S. port for the purpose of loading or unloading any freight for 180 days from the date the vessel departed Cuba. Vessels engaging solely in trade with Cuba that is authorized or exempt from the Regulations (e.g., vessels carrying authorized exports of agricultural products or donations of food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals) are authorized pursuant to § 515.550 to enter U.S. ports notwithstanding these two prohibitions.¶ D. Importing Cuban-origin goods or services¶ Importing from Cuba requires dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, and is therefore prohibited. The Regulations also include a specific prohibition on importing and dealing in merchandise that is of Cuban origin, that has been derived from Cuba- origin materials, or that has been located or transported through Cuba. As a result, no such merchandise (including souvenirs) may be imported into the United States either directly or through third countries such as Canada or Mexico absent a license from OFAC. The only exception to this prohibition is for “information or informational materials,” as defined in¶ § 515.332 of the Regulations. Examples include publications, recorded music, and certain artwork.¶ E. Nationals of Cuba; specially designated nationals; Cuban nationals who have taken up permanent residence outside of Cuba¶ The Regulations prohibit transactions involving Cuban nationals wherever they are located. Cuban nationals who have become permanent residents or citizens of the United States, however, are authorized as “unblocked nationals,” and there are no restrictions on transactions with them. Most transactions with nationals of Cuba who are otherwise lawfully present in the United States in a non-visitor status also are authorized. Individual nationals of Cuba who have taken up permanent residence outside of Cuba may apply to OFAC to be specifically licensed as unblocked nationals. See § 515.505 of the Regulations.¶ Additionally, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized by § 515.505(d) to engage in any transaction with an individual national of Cuba who has taken up permanent residence outside of Cuba as if that individual were unblocked, except that all property in which the individual national of Cuba has an interest that was blocked before establishing permanent residence, or was blocked before January 28, 2011, whichever date is later, shall remain blocked. For example, if a Cuban national establishes permanent residence in Spain in May 2012, new transactions initiated, or bank accounts opened, with U.S. banks after May 2012 are not blocked, and the U.S. bank may provide all banking services not otherwise prohibited. The Cuban national would not, however, ￼have access to funds blocked before May 2012. Those funds would remain blocked until the individual is specifically licensed as an unblocked national. If the Cuban national established permanent residence in Spain in May 2010, only transactions initiated, or bank accounts opened, after January 28, 2011 (not May 2010) would be authorized. In determining whether an individual national of Cuba has taken up permanent residence outside Cuba, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction must obtain from the individual copies of at least two documents indicating permanent residence, such as a passport, voter registration card, permanent resident alien card, or national identity card.¶ Individuals and entities who act on behalf of Cuba anywhere in the world also are considered by OFAC to be nationals of Cuba. To help the public identify such individuals and entities, some of their names and other identifying information are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”). The SDN List is available on OFAC’s Web site at www.treasury.gov/sdn. This list is non- exhaustive. All persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction engaging in transactions with foreign nationals are advised to make certain that such foreign nationals are not Cuban nationals.¶ F. Accounts and assets¶ Unless authorized or exempt, all property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest and that is in the United States or in the possession or control of persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction is blocked. Such blocking imposes a complete prohibition on transfers or transactions involving Cuba or Cuban nationals. Payments, transfers, withdrawals, or other dealings with respect to blocked property may not take place unless authorized by the Department of the Treasury or exempt. All persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction in possession of blocked property are required to notify OFAC. See § 501.603 of the Regulations. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who engage in any unauthorized transaction involving Cuba or a Cuban national or property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, either directly or indirectly, risk substantial monetary penalties and criminal prosecution.¶ U.S. banks receiving unauthorized wire transfer instructions in which there is a Cuban interest, or any instrument in which there is a Cuban interest, must freeze the funds on their own books or block the instrument, regardless of origin or destination. “Suspense accounts” are not permitted. Except as authorized, no bank in the United States or overseas branch or subsidiary of a U.S. bank may advise a letter of credit involving Cuba or a Cuban national, nor may it process documents referencing Cuba. Banks are permitted to collect normal service charges on blocked accounts, and must pay interest on funds in such accounts. “Set-offs” are not allowed.¶ Access to a safe deposit box leased to a Cuban national or containing property in which a Cuban national has an interest is authorized under certain conditions pursuant to § 515.517.¶ VIII. HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS AND GIFT PARCELS¶ OFAC and the Department of Commerce jointly administer the regulation of exports to Cuba of gift parcels and humanitarian donations. Most financial and other transactions related to exports from the United States, including humanitarian donations and gift parcels, authorized by the Department of Commerce are authorized by the Regulations. For the relevant Department of￼Commerce regulations, please see parts 740 and 746 of the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Chapter 7, available online at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov). Please note that Cuba travel-related transactions directly incident to humanitarian donations must be specifically licensed by OFAC pursuant to § 515.533(g) of the Regulations.¶ Pursuant to parts 740 and 746 of the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Chapter 7, available online at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov), gift parcels may be sent or carried by an authorized traveler to an individual or to a religious, charitable, or educational organization in Cuba, subject to certain limitations.¶ Organizations that consolidate and send multiple gift parcels in single shipments must obtain a validated license from the Department of Commerce. Each gift parcel in the single shipment must meet specific commodity, dollar-value, and frequency limitations. If a parcel being shipped or carried to Cuba fails to meet these standards, it is subject to seizure by the U.S. Government. Please contact the Department of Commerce for further details.¶ IX. MAIL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN CUBA A. Mail¶ All transactions of common carriers incident to the receipt or transmission of mail between the United States and Cuba are authorized. Please see § 515.542(a) of the Regulations.¶ B. Telecommunications services¶ Certain telecommunications services, contracts, related payments, and travel-related transactions are authorized pursuant to §§ 515.533, 515.542, and 515.564 of the Regulations.¶ 1. U.S. telecommunications services providers are authorized to engage in all transactions incident to the provision of telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba, the provision of satellite radio or satellite television services to Cuba, and the provision of roaming services involving telecommunications services providers in Cuba. Please see¶ § 515.542(b).¶ 2. Section 515.542(c) authorizes persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to contract with and pay non-Cuban telecommunications services providers for services provided to particular individuals in Cuba (other than certain prohibited Cubans). For example, an individual in the United States may pay a U.S. or third-country telecommunications company to provide cellular telephone service for a phone owned and used by that individual’s friend in Cuba. Likewise, a U.S. telecommunications services provider may enter into a contract with a particular individual in Cuba to provide telecommunications services to that individual.¶ 3. Transactions incident to establishing facilities to provide telecommunications services linking the United States and Cuba, including fiber-optic cables and satellite facilities, are authorized pursuant to § 515.542(d)(1). OFAC also may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis authorizing transactions incident to establishing facilities to provide telecommunications services linking third countries and Cuba in certain circumstances pursuant to￼§ 515.542(d)(2). Please contact the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security regarding any required authorization for the exportation or re-exportation of goods and technology to Cuba or a third country for the establishment of such telecommunications facilities.¶ 4. Any entity subject to U.S. jurisdiction relying on § 515.542(b), (c), (d)(1), or (d)(2) must notify OFAC in writing within 30 days after commencing or ceasing to offer such telecommunications services, and furnish semiannual reports providing the total amount of all payments made to Cuba or a third country related to such services during the prior six months. Please see § 515.542(e).¶ 5. As noted in part II(H)(1) of this brochure, Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to participation in professional meetings for the commercial marketing of, sales negotiation for, or performance under contracts for the provision of certain telecommunications services, or the establishment of facilities to provide certain telecommunications services, are authorized pursuant to § 515.564(a)(3), with limitations. As noted in part II(H)(2) of this brochure, Cuba travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to the commercial marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing in Cuba of telecommunications-related items that have been licensed for export by the Department of Commerce are authorized pursuant to¶ § 515.533(f), with limitations.¶ C. Internet-based communications services¶ Pursuant to § 515.578 of the Regulations, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may export to persons in Cuba services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user. This authorization does not extend to the exportation of services with knowledge or reason to know that such services are intended for a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, the exportation of Internet connectivity services or telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite links or dedicated lines), or the exportation of web-hosting services that are for purposes other than personal communications (e.g., web-hosting services for commercial endeavors) or of domain name registration services.¶ OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis for the exportation of other services incident to the sharing of information over the Internet. Please see §§ 515.533 and 515.559.¶ X. FAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES¶ Pursuant to § 515.572(b) of the Regulations, authorized Travel, Carrier, and Remittance Forwarding Service Providers are prohibited from participating in discriminatory practices of the Government of Cuba against individuals or particular classes of travelers. The assessment of consular fees by the Government of Cuba, which is applicable worldwide, is not considered to be a discriminatory practice. However, requiring the purchase of services not desired by the traveler is not permitted. Persons wishing to provide information on such activities should call OFAC’s ￼Miami office at 786/845-2829. All information furnished to the Department of the Treasury regarding arbitrary fees, payments for unauthorized purposes, or other possible violations will be handled confidentially.¶ XI. ESTATES¶ An estate of a Cuban national, or in which a Cuban national has an interest, including as a personal representative, creditor, heir, legatee, devisee, distributee, or beneficiary, and that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction is blocked. Any life insurance policy or annuity contract in which a Cuban national has an interest also is blocked. Please see § 515.570(f)(1) of the Regulations for information about remittances from inherited funds.¶ XII. PAYMENTS FOR OVERFLIGHTS¶ Specific licenses may be issued authorizing payment to Cuba for services rendered by Cuba in connection with overflights of Cuba or emergency landings in Cuba by United States aircraft. Please see § 515.548 of the Regulations.¶ XIII. EMERGENCIES¶ In case of an emergency while in Cuba, a traveler should contact the U.S. Interests Section in Havana at 537/833-3551 through 3559 during business hours, or 537/833-2302 for emergencies at other times.

C. Vote negative

1. Predictable limits – blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any positive interaction with another country topical – becomes impossible for the neg to predict or prepare

2. Equitable ground – the economic limit is vital to critiques of economics, trade disads, and non-economic counterplans

### Case

None of their evidence says lifting the embargo leads to a new era of multilateralism – it just says lifting the embargo is a multilateral action

The plan fails and that public backlash takes out solvency

Lake 10 (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

**Aff can’t resolve their internal links – no explanation of how we cooperate with non-democracies, whether future policymakers maintain a different mindset**

Guantanamo, Kyoto, ICC and CRC are alt causes

Burgsdorff, 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

**Countries share resources and it is not the root cause of any conflict**

**Victor 07**— professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (David, Nov 14, “What resource wars?” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/IK14Dj04.html>) Jacome

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen - usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny - the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.

Their discourse of “resource conflicts” is a militartized justification for unending liberal violence and intervention

*---example : Iraqi invasion of Kuwaiti oilfields, to civil wars fuelled by diamonds in West Africa, Ugandan or Zimbabwean military deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo over issues like diamonds with the Ugandan or Zimbabwean military deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo*

Le Billon, 4a geographer, author and Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia, and a researcher at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, PhD from Oxford **(**Philippe, “The Geopolitical Economy of 'Resource Wars,” 2004 http://www.neiu.edu/~dgrammen/2004LEBILLON.pdf

Natural resources have gained a new strategic importance in wars. With the withdrawal of Cold War foreign sponsorship in the late 1980s, local resources have become the mainstay of most war economics. Beyond financing war, natural resources have been depicted as an important motive of several wars in the 1990s, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaiti oilfields, to civil wars fuelled by diamonds in West Africa. While much attention had been previously devoted to the risk of armed conflicts resulting from the vulnerability of supply of 'strategic resources\* for major powers or environmental scarcity in poor countries, most resource-related wars in the 1990s have opposed domestic or regional politico-military entrepreneurs over locally abundant and internationally valuable resources, such as oil, timber, or diamonds. In this light, some interventions by regional powers have been tainted by the 'lust' for valuable resources, as with the Ugandan or Zimbabwean military deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo.' Speaking of the 'poisonous mix\* of diamonds and greed fuelling the war in Sierra Leone, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan even suggested that 'when a whole Guincan battalion [of peacekeepers] on its way to Sierra Leone — 900 men with Armoured Personal Carriers — said they were disarmed [by rebels], you wonder ... Did they sell them?\*2 This introductory essay examines the geopolitical economy of so-called 'resource wars', that is, armed conflicts revolving 'to a significant degree, over the pursuit or possession of critical materials'.\* The term 'resource war' itself emerged in the US in the early 1980s in reference to perceived Soviet threats over US access to Middle Eastern oil and African minerals.' Beyond this conventional geopolitical and strategic perspective on resource competition, this essay argues that the significance of resources in wars is largely rooted in the political and economic vulnerabilities of resource dependent states. This essay stresses the links between (mis(governance, conflicts, and the historical legacy of the social construction and exploitation of 'resources' by imperial powers, as well as the current multiscalar practices of the global political economy in which commodity and financial (lows arc rarely matched with informational and 'ethical' ones. Resources have specific historic, geographic, and social qualities participating in shaping the patterns of conflicts and violences. The discursive construction and materiality of oil and diamonds, for example, entail distinct social practices, stakes, and potential conflicts associated with their territorial control, exploitation, commercialization, and consumption. Among these qualities, their territorialization as well as physical, economic and discursive characteristics come to define resources both materially and socially in dialectic relationships with institutions and practices. As pointed out by Kevin Dunn in the case of Central Africa, 'the material aspects of a war economy are intrinsically linked to its discursive production'; whereby perceptions of threats, sectarian identity politics and spaces of (insecurity inform and reflect the so-called 'greedy' dimensions of (violent) resource extraction and trade.5 The crucial interplay between specific institutions, spaces of governance and resources also needs to be stressed, as demonstrated by Rick Auty and Michael Watts in this volume. In this regard the understanding of so-called 'resource curse' and 'resource wars' needs to give consideration to both the forms of power exercised in the 'pre-rcsource' era, as well as the specific ways in which different resources define specific 'political idioms' and influence social and political outcomes. This study focuses on the relative importance of the materiality of resources and their geography vis-a-vis the type and course of conflicts. The following section briefly reviews the evolution of geopolitical perspectives on resource competition. The third section examines the political economy of resource dependence in relation to the causes of conflict. The fourth section demonstrates the importance of different resources in financing armed conflicts, with the fifth section stressing the complicity and responsibilities of businesses in this regard. The sixth section outlines different geographies of'resource wars' according to the characteristics of resources. In conclusion, the study briefly considers regulatory initiatives brought to bear on belligerents and businesses to prevent 'resource wars'. Resources have provided some of the means and motive of global European power expansion, while also being Ihc focus of inter-state rivalry and strategic denial of access. Western geopolitical thinking about resources has been dominated by the equation of trade, war, and power, at the core of which were overseas resources and maritime navigation. During the mercantilist period of the fifteenth century, trade and war became intimately linked to protect or interdict the accumulation of 'world riches', mostly in the form of bullion, enabled by progress in maritime transport and upon which much of the balance of power was perceived to depend.\* For example, the decision to pursue 'commerce warfare', in effect piracy, by French military engineer Vauban aimed, but failed, at precipitating the downfall of English and Dutch power by targeting their maritime trading.' Writing on the wake of the three consecutive wars between the English and the Dutch in the seventeenth century, John Evelyn commented that. Whoever commands the ocean commands the trade of the world, and whoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and whoever is master of that commands the world itself.\* Since sea power itself rested on access to timber, naval timber supply became a major preoccupation for major European powers from the seventeenth century onwards. Besides motivating overseas alliances, trade, or even imperialist rule, England in particular pursued a policy of open sea 'at all costs' that led to several armed interventions in the Baltic; a situation that would bear similarities with the case of oil in the twentieth century\* With growing industrialization and increasing dependence on imported materials during the nineteenth century, western powers intensified their control over raw materials, leading along with many other factors such as political ideologies to an imperialist 'scramble' over much of the rest of the world.10 Late imperial initiatives also influenced the Prussian strategy of consolidating their economic self-sufficiency through a resource access provided by a 'vital space', or Lebensraum, while the potential role of railways to enable land- based transcontinental control of resources raised a threat to maritime-based power, giving way to the idea of 'Heartland' developed by Halford Mackindcr. The significance of imported resources, and in particular oil, during the First World War reinforced the idea of resource vulnerability, which was again confirmed during the Second World War." Strategic thinking about resources during the Cold War continued to focus on the vulnerability of rising resource supply dependence, and to consider the potential for international conflicts resulting from competition over access to key resources.'2 In their search for resource security and strategic advantage, industrialized countries continued to take a diversity of initiatives (on the vulnerability of western energy supply, see Susannc Peters in this volume), including military deployment near exploitation sites and along shipping lanes, stockpiling of strategic resources, diplomatic support, 'gunboat' policies, proxy wars or coup d'etat to maintain allied regimes in producing countries, as well as support to transnational corporations and favourable international trade agreements.Geopolitical discourses and practices of resource competition were not only defined at an international scale but as well as at a sub-national one, especially in reference to the territorial legacy surviving the decolonization process and its implications in terms of resource control (see the discussion of secessions, below). By the 1970s, concerns also came to encompass the potential threat of political instability resulting from population growth, environmental degradation, and social inequalities in poor countries, leading to a redefinition of national security." The ensuing concept of 'environmental security\* emerged to reflect ideas of global interdependence, illustrated through the debates on global warming, environmental 'limits to growth1, or political instability associated with environmental scarcity in the South (for a critique, sec Simon Dalby's Environmental Security).1\* Traditional western strategic thinking remained, however, mostly concerned with supply vulnerability within the framework of the two blocs, notably about Soviet threats over the western control of oil in the Persian Gulf or 'strategic minerals' in Southern and Central Africa." The decolonization process, the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the 1979 Iranian revolution also clearly focused western strategic concerns on the part of western governments as well as resource businesses, over domestic and regional political stability and alliances.1" The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet empire, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait further reinforceed this view. Although the security of supply continues to inform governmental and corporate decisions in the management of several minerals, in particular with regard to high-tech and radioactive materials, oil stands apart in terms of global strategic importance.17

**Zero risk of protectionism**

**Ahearn 9** [Raymond, CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism,” March 23, 2009, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19395.pdf]

There are a number of reasons why the threat of a return to protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies could be vastly overstated. Unlike the 1930s, today’s global economy has several strong firewalls to prevent governments from raising trade barriers that result in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. These firewalls include more institutionalized obstacles to protectionism built into the WTO system, more policy instruments to address the economic slowdown, and a more interdependent and open world economy than existed in the 1930s. In addition, some in today’s media may tend to overstate the threat of protectionism by not always distinguishing between protectionist actions and protectionist pressures and/or by equating legitimate forms of protection with protectionism. The fact that there is ample room for increases in trade measures and barriers that are consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO often may go unappreciated in some press coverage. These trade measures and barriers include increases in applied tariffs to bound rates, and imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties, so-called ‘defensive’ trade measures.4 Protection for limited periods of time and under prescribed conditions is built into the rules of the WTO as a political safety valve and as a recognition of the human and social costs that are associated with the often wrenching adjustments that accompany increased trade competition. Firewalls Against Protectionism WTO rules today serve to keep a lid on trade barriers of its 153 members through an elaborate set of mutual obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Unlike the 1930s when countries could impose higher trade barriers unilaterally without violating any international agreements or anticipating a foreign reaction, under today’s rules members can take their disputes to the WTO for settlement rather than engaging in reciprocal retaliatory actions. The fact that countries violating WTO obligations can face WTO-sanctioned retaliation helps constrain outbreaks of unilateral actions that could be mutually harmful.5 Pressures for protection are also dampened by a world economy that is much more interdependent and integrated than in the 1930s.6 Leading producers have become so international in their production operations and supply chains that they have developed a vested interest in resisting protectionism.7 Many industries that have faced import competition in the past – such as televisions and semiconductors—have found that international diversification or joint ventures with foreign partners are a more profitable way of coping with global competition than blocking goods at the border. In addition, many domestic industries have less incentive to ask for import restrictions because foreign rivals now produce in the domestic market, eliminating the benefits of trade barriers for domestic firms.8 Unlike the early 1930s, when governments took little responsibility for propping up financial institutions and were unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies due to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, policymakers around the world today are adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. These expansionary policies, in turn, have the capability of dampening protectionist pressures and demands that stem from job losses and related economic hardship with lower interest rates and increased expenditures on unemployment benefits and health care benefits.9 A related consideration is that today’s world economy is much more open than the world economy of the 1930s. Average tariffs on world trade have come down from the 50% range in the 1930s, to the 25% range in the 1980s, and to less than 10% today.10 Under these circumstances, it would require tremendous increases in protection to get the world back to anywhere near the conditions of the 1930s, although a major increase in tariffs (e.g. a doubling) would be disruptive even if it left tariffs well below the 1930s levels. Scorecard of Protective Measures To Date Empirical support exists for the view that existing legal, economic, and political firewalls are restraining today’s protectionist pressures. Most importantly, Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director General, reported in January 2009 that most WTO members have successfully kept domestic protectionist pressures under control “with only limited evidence of increases in trade restricting or trade distorting measures” taken during the last six months of 2008. This assessment was based on the first report of the WTO secretariat on the trade effects of the global economic crisis. The report found only “limited evidence” of an increase in tariffs, non-tariff barriers or trade-remedy actions by member countries, but noted that the most significant actions taken in response to the global crisis have involved “financial support of one kind or another to banks and other financial institutions and to certain industries, notably the automobile industry.”11 The WTO report notes tariff increases on selected products being implemented by India, Russia, Ecuador, and Ukraine. Countries adopting non-tariff measures include Indonesia (port of entry barriers) and Argentina (import licensing requirements). Argentina was cited for measures that attempt to boost exports of selected products. But the report indicates that there has been “no dramatic increase” in antidumping investigations in the second half of 2008 compared to first half of 2008, but raised the possibility of increased trade remedy actions in 2009.12 The World Bank, which has also been monitoring trade restrictions proposed and adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis, reached a conclusion similar to that of the WTO. Its initial report determined that there have been 47 trade restrictive measures imposed since the financial crisis began last summer, including 17 from G-20 countries, but that “these measures have probably had only marginal effects on trade flows to date.” In addition to the measures cited by the WTO, the World Bank report cited China’s import ban on various food products from the EU, and export subsidies provided by the EU, China, and India. Contrary to the WTO report, the World Bank report determined that “the number of antidumping cases (both investigations initiated and imposition of duties) surged in 2008.”13

**Economic threat predictions will cause the US to manipulate regimes in a non-democratic fashion---link turns the whole case and empirically kills millions**

**Neocleous**, Prof of Gov, **08** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, p95-]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its

economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped **co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101

Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102

In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of **intervention and policing all over the globe**. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere.

Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an **ambitious and frequently violent strategy.** Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the **‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104

‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have

been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-

opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the

reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108

Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order.

The result has been the **slaughter of untold numbers**. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this:

Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of **six million people killed – and this is a minimum** ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109

Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it.

While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110

In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111

Status quo adaptation solves the warming impact

NIPCC 11 Archived 8 March, Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

(Citing: Willis, K.J., Bennett, K.D., Bhagwat, S.A. and Birks, H.J.B. 2010. 4°C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past? Systematics and Biodiversity 8: 3-9.)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2 will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**Environmental alarmism is unfounded and not a justification for taking action**

**Kaleita, 7** – PHD, Assistant Professor Agricultural and Biosystems Engineering (Amy, “Hysteria’s History”Environmental Alarmism in Context”, <http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070920_Hysteria_History.pdf>)

Apocalyptic stories about the irreparable, catastrophic damage that humans are doing to the natural environment have been around for a long time. These hysterics often have some basis in reality, but are blown up to illogical and ridiculous proportions. Part of the reason they’re so appealing is that they have the ring of plausibility along with the intrigue of a horror flick. In many cases, the alarmists identify a legitimate issue, take the possible consequences to an extreme, and advocate action on the basis of these extreme projections. In 1972, the editor of the journal *Nature* pointed out the problem with the typical alarmist approach: “[Alarmists’] most common error is to suppose that the worst will always happen.”82 But of course, if the worst always happened, the human race would have died out long ago. When alarmism has a basis in reality, the challenge becomes to take appropriate action based on that reality, not on the hysteria. The aftermath of *Silent Spring* offers examples of both sorts of policy reactions: a reasoned response to a legitimate problem and a knee-jerk response to the hysteria. On the positive side, *Silent Spring* brought an end to the general belief that all synthetic chemicals in use for purposes ranging from insect control to household cleaning were uniformly wonderful, and it ushered in an age of increased caution on their appropriate use. In the second chapter of her famous book, Carson wrote, “It is not my contention that chemical insecticides must never be used. I do contend that… we have allowed these chemicals to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil, water, wildlife, and man himself.” Indeed, Carson seemed to advocate reasoned response to rigorous scientific investigation, and in fact this did become the modern approach to environmental chemical licensure and monitoring. An hour-long CBS documentary on pesticides was aired during the height of the furor over *Silent Spring*. In the documentary, Dr. Page Nicholson, a water-pollution expert with the Public Health Service, wasn’t able to answer how long pesticides persist in water once they enter it, or the extent to which pesticides contaminate groundwater supplies. Today, this sort of information is gathered through routine testing of chemicals for use in the environment. 20 V: Lessons from the Apocalypse Ironically, rigorous investigation was not used in the decision to ban DDT, primarily due to the hysteria *Silent Spring* generated. In this example, the hysteria took on a life of its own, even trumping the author’s original intent. There was, as we have seen, a more sinister and tragic response to the hysteria generated by *Silent Spring*. Certain developing countries, under significant pressure from the United States, abandoned the use of DDT. This decision resulted in millions of deaths from malaria and other insect-borne diseases. In the absence of pressure to abandon the use of DDT, these lives would have been spared. It would certainly have been possible to design policies requiring caution and safe practices in the use of supplemental chemicals in the environment, without pronouncing a death sentence on millions of people. A major challenge in developing appropriate responses to legitimate problems is that alarmism catches people’s attention and draws them in. Alarmism is given more weight than it deserves, as policy makers attempt to appease their constituency and the media. It polarizes the debaters into groups of “believers” and “skeptics,” so that reasoned, fact-based compromise is difficult to achieve. Neither of these aspects of alarmism is healthy for the development of appropriate policy. Further, alarmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them wisely. But energy-resource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent scientific advancement by cherry-picking and favoring one particular replacement technology at the expense of other promising technologies. Environmental alarmism should be taken for what it is—a natural tendency of some portion of the public to latch onto the worst, and most unlikely, potential outcome. Alarmism should not be used as the basis for policy. Where a real problem exists, solutions should be based on reality, not hysteria.

**Biodiversity is resilient - models are based on islands and not true for larger land areas**

**Lomborg, 1**; (Bjørn, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, Danish author, academic, “The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World,” Cambridge University Press, originally published in Danish in 1998)

The correlation between the number of species and area was formulated by the biologist E.O. Wilson in the late 1960s. The model seem appealingly intuitive. Its logic is that the more space there is the more species can exist. The theory was launched in order to explain the number of species on islands, and it works well in this context. Wilson formulated a rule of thumb: if the area is reduced by 90 percent, then the number of species will be halved. But the question is, of course, whether the theory for islands can be used on large and forested areas such as rainforests. If islands get smaller, there is nowhere to escape. If, on the other hand, one tract of rainforest is cut down, many animals and plants can go on living in the surrounding areas. One obvious thing to do would be to look at our own experiment, the one carried out in Europe and North America. In both places, primary forest was reduced by approximately 98-99 percent. In the US, the eastern forests were reduced over two centuries to fragments totaling just 1-2 percent of their original area, but nonetheless this resulted in the extinction of only one forest bird. The largest tropical study of the correlation between rainforest and the extinction of species was carried out in Puerto Rico by Ariel Lugo of the United States Department of Agriculture. He found that the primary forest had been reduced by 99 percent of a species of 400 years. “Only” seven out of 60 species of birds had become extinct although the island today is home to 97 species of birds. This indicates a serious problem with Wilson’s rule of thumb. And what is perhaps more astonishing is that even though the area of primary forest on Puerto Rico was reduced by 99 percent they ended up with *more* species of birds?

**Soil erosion inevitable – natural and artificial alt causes**

Maine Bureau of Land and Water Quality, 2000(<http://www.state.me.us/dep/blwq/doceducation/dirt.htm>)

Soil erosion is the #1 source of pollution to surface water in Maine. Each year rainstorms and snowmelt wash tons of dirt off the land around Maine. How could something so ‘natural’ be so bad? Soil erosion is natural after all. However, when we change the landscape from forest to yards, streets, farm fields, shopping centers and roads, we accelerate soil erosion. In the USA, soil is eroding at about *seventeen times* the rate at which it forms. Erosion results in:  (1) higher project costs, (2) damage to aquatic habitat, (3) reduced water quality, (4) elimination of trout and salmon fisheries, (5) lower shorefront property values, (6) higher property taxes, and (6) loss of business and jobs.  Soil is a valuable resource on the land, but when washed into streams, lakes, and estuaries it is Maine's biggest water quality problem.

**No extinction from disease**

**Gladwell, 95** – writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic (Malcolm, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

**The fear of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”**

**Gomel 2000** (Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

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Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

More specifically, environmental reformism is merely an exercise in blame shifting and assuaging guilt, shielding us from ever having to take responsibility for our own personal complicity in the environmental crisis

Bobertz, 95 (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n18) family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n20) but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n22) This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n24) were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n26)Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n28) Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n30) [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n32) To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

### FW A2: Institutions

**Their concerns over ceding the political are superficial and misdirected—they ignore all of the other avenues for social change in a myopic rush to seek state-centered solutions**

**Weissberg 4** (Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-UrbanaRobert Weissberg is., Society “Abandoning Politics,” May/June,http://transactionpub. metapress.com/app/home/content.asp)

The conventional wisdom tells us that Americans are generally politically apathetic and, judging by re- cent voting trends this situation may be deteriorating. **Self-appointed civic guardians predictably express profound unease about this disengagement and offer up a plethora of remedies**, everything from user-friendly ballots to electronic versions of democracy to reenergize political life. **Academics seem especially alarmed that apathy will impede impoverished minorities** from climbing up the socio-economic ladder **while allowing “special interest” to ride roughshod over the common good. Alas, these discussions are quite superficial and misdirected**. At most, those damning apathy glibly offer unproven clichés about “rising alienation” and similar banalities as if Americans were suddenly paralyzed to shape the world around them. Laments about lethargy fail to grasp that this disengagement only reflects a shift in choice of weapons, not laziness. **Those grumbling about idle parents reluctant to pressure government for better schools incorrectly assume that rejecting politics will necessarily guarantee shoddy education**. Ditto for those who seem “indifferent” about crime, the environment, high taxes and just about all other maladies—misery awaits those who sit on the sidelines. Reality is more nuanced and, critically, this reflexive bewailing of apathy reflects a state centered view of progress so, ipso facto, political disengagement preordains failure. **Fortunately, the United States is not a totalitarian system in which the government is the only game in town. This myopic focus on state-centered solutions also obscures an important emerging fact. To the extent that abandoning politically directed remedies is not ideologically uniform, the civic landscape will soon be profoundly altered.** In a nut- shell, the Left with its deep commitment to political solutions will continue to dominate policy-making while the nation as a whole quietly moves rightward.

**Environment Agency**

Specifically the 1AC’s claim that warming is an inevitable phenomen that controls every other impact is a form of climate reductionism that results in fatalism and turns its own end

Hulme, 11

Mike Hulme, Climate and Culture in the Department of Geography in the School of Social Science & Public Policy at King’s College London and a member of the Environment, Politics and Development Group; “Reducing the future to climate: a story of climate determinism and reductionism more,” August 2010, http://www.academia.edu/739876/Reducing\_the\_future\_to\_climate\_a\_story\_of\_climate\_determinism\_and\_reductionism //bghs-ms

Now, a hundred years later, and at the beginning of a new century, heightening anxieties about future anthropogenic climate change are fuelling – and in turn being fuelled by - a new variety of the determinist fallacy. Although distinct from the politically and ethically discredited climate determinism epitomised by Ellsworth Huntington and his followers, climate has regained some of its former power for ‘explaining’ the performance of environments, peoples and societies. In seeking to predict a climate-shaped future, the complexity of interactions between climates, environments and societies is reduced and a new variant of climate determinism emerges. I call this ‘climate reductionism’, a form of analysis and prediction in which climate is first extracted from the matrix of interdependencies which shape human life within the physical world. Once isolated, climate is then elevated to the role of dominant predictor variable. I argue in this paper that climate reductionism is a methodology that has become dominant in analyses of present and future environmental change – and that as a methodology it has deficiencies. This way of thinking and analysing finds expression in some of the balder (and bolder) claims made by scientists, analysts and commentators about the future impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Here are some examples of claims in which emerge from this climate reductionist form of analysis:¶ •¶ Every year climate change leaves over 300,000 people dead;¶ •¶ We predict, on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, that 15–37%of species ... will be ‘committed to extinction’;¶ •¶ 185 million people in sub-Saharan Africa alone could die of disease directly attributable to climate change by the end of the century; The costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever ... [rising to] 20% of GDP or more;¶ •¶ I think there will be substantial change [in climate] whatever we do. If we do nothing over the next 20 years it will be catastrophic. If we do nothing over the next 50 to 100 years it might even be terminal¶ 10¶ Such reductionism is also contributing to the new discourse about climate change and conflict. For example, climate change is offered as an explanation of cycles of war and conflict in China over the last millennium: “It was the oscillations of agricultural production brought about by long-term climate change that drove China's historical war-peace cycles” The civil war in Darfur is categorised in the media as the first ‘climate change war’ of the new century with the prospect of more to come: “In decades to come, Darfur may be seen as one of the first true climate change wars”¶ 12¶ . The recent report¶ Climate Change as a Security Risk ¶ from the German Advisory Council on Global Change¶ 13¶ was reported in similar neo-determinist tones in the media: “Climate change to cause wars in North Africa”¶ 14¶ and “Climate change ‘likely to cause wars’” And a team of agricultural and resource economists went even further in predicting the effect of temperature increases on future battle deaths in Africa: “[the] historical ¶ Revised August 2010 To appear in Osiris, Summer 2011 Not to be cited without author’s permission¶ response to temperature suggests an additional 393,000 battle deaths [by 2030] if future wars areas deadly as recent wars”¶ 16¶ And related to this explanatory role of climate in determining war, climate refugees are seemingly set to threaten global, regional and national security in a re-run of the Mongol invasions of Europe alluded to in the opening quote from Owen Lattimore in his caricature of Ellsworth Huntington’s climatic theory of world history. The term ‘climate refugees’ was first seeded by Norman Myers in a 1993 article ¶ 17¶ and his estimate of between 150 and 250 million climate refugees by 2050 has been subsequently widely cited. It is a claim that easily translates into powerful rhetoric, as in this example from the Royal United Services Institute in the UK: “If we fail to stop polluting, we will be committed to catastrophic and irreversible change ... which will directly displace hundreds of millions of people and critically undermine the livelihoods of billions.”¶ 18¶ And recent work has sought to quantify this climate change effect on migration more precisely: “... by approximately the year 2080, climate change is estimated to induce 1.4 to 6.7million adult Mexicans to emigrate [to the USA] as a result of declines in agricultural productivity alone”¶ 19¶ In this new mood of climate-driven destiny the human hand of climate change has replaced the divine hand of God as being responsible for the collapse of civilisations.¶ 20¶ , for visitations of extreme weather 21 and for determining the new twenty-first century wealth of nations22. And to emphasise the message and the mood, the New Economics Foundation and its partners have wound up the climate clock which is now ticking, second-by-second, until 1 December 2016 when human fate is handed over to the winds, ocean currents and drifting ice- floes of a de-stabilised global climate: “We have 100 months to save the planet; when the clock stops ticking we could be beyond the climate’s tipping point, the point of no return”23. Such eschatological rhetoric offers a post-2016 world where the degrees of human freedom and agency are extinguished by the iron-grip of the forces of climate. **Such a narrative offers scant chance for humans to escape the inevitability of a climate-shaped destiny**24. Jim Lovelock offers the most vivid melodrama of such a pre-determined fate. We are travelling, he says, on “a rocky path to a Stone Age existence on an ailing planet, one where few of us survive among the wreckage of our once biodiverse Earth”25.¶ My argument in this paper is that these sentiments, and many others which invade contemporary public and political discourses of climate change, are enabled by the methodology of climate reductionism (i.e., a form of neo-environmental determinism). **Simulations of future climate from climate models are inappropriately elevated as universal predictors of future social performance and human destiny**. I am not alone in making this argument, even if my focus here is exclusively on climate rather than on the role of the wider physical environment. For example geographers Andrew Sluyter, Christopher Merrett and Gabriel Judkins26 have all detected evidence of a resurgence of the determinist fallacy, citing examples from the work of Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs and Steel and Collapse and Geoffrey Sachs in The End of Poverty and Common Wealth.¶ After offering a brief account of how climate reductionism has come to prominence, I turn my attention to understanding why this should be. Why should an explanatory logic – if not an ideology - dating from earlier intellectual and imperial eras, a logic subsequently dismissed by many as seriously wanting, have re-emerged in different form in a new century to find new and enthusiastic audiences? Rather than offering an explanation, and hence a justification, for the superiority of imperial societies, cultures and races – as in past ideological variants of determinism – I will suggest here a different reason for the contemporary attraction of climate reductionism, and how it has come to prominence.¶ I suggest that the hegemony exerted by the predictive natural sciences over human attempts to understand the unfolding future, opens up the spaces for climate reductionism to emerge. It is a hegemony manifest in the pivotal role held by climate (and related) modelling in shaping climate change discourses. Because of the epistemological authority over the future claimed, either implicitly or explicitly, by such modelling activities27, climate becomes the one ‘known’ variable in an otherwise unknowable future. The openness, contingency and multiple possibilities of the future are closed off as these predicted virtual climates assert their influence over everything from future ecology, economic activity and social mobility, to human behaviour, cultural evolution and geosecurity. It is climate reductionism exercised through what I call ‘epistemological slippage’ - a transfer of predictive authority from one domain of knowledge to another without appropriate theoretical or analytical justification.¶

That cedes our agency to the biological sciences – this is uniquely true in the context of the aff’s argument that nobody can adapt to climate change without the plan – agency is an independent impact

Hulme, 11

Mike Hulme, Climate and Culture in the Department of Geography in the School of Social Science & Public Policy at King’s College London and a member of the Environment, Politics and Development Group; “Reducing the future to climate: a story of climate determinism and reductionism more,” August 2010, http://www.academia.edu/739876/Reducing\_the\_future\_to\_climate\_a\_story\_of\_climate\_determinism\_and\_reductionism //bghs-ms

In summary, my argument concerns the hegemony held by the predictive natural and biological sciences over visions of the future. In the case of climate change, this hegemony is rooted in the knowledge claims of climate, or Earth system, models. In the absence of comparable epistemological reach emerging from the social sciences or humanities, these claims lend disproportionate discursive power to model-based descriptions of putative future climates. It thus becomes tempting to adopt a reductionist methodology when examining possible social futures. ‘Lots of things will change in the future, but since we have credible and quantitative knowledge about future climate let us examine, also quantitatively, what the consequences of these climates for society might be’. The subsequent and derived climate impact modelling then boldly calculates, for example, the billions of people who because of climate change will become starving or thirsty64, or the millions who because of climate change will be made destitute or homeless65. Climate reductionism is the means by which the knowledge claims of the climate modellers are transferred, by proximity as it were, to the putative knowledge claims of the social, economic and political analysts.¶ This transfer of predictive authority, an almost accidental transfer one might suggest rather than one necessarily driven by any theoretical or ideological stance, is what I earlier defined as “epistemological slippage”. If not quite the inexorable geometric calculus of Malthus, it nevertheless offers a future written in the unyielding language of mathematics and computer code. These models and calculations allow for little human agency, little recognition of evolving, adapting and innovating societies, and little attempt to consider the changing values, cultures and practices of humanity. The contingencies of the future are whitewashed out of the future. **Humans are depicted as “dumb farmers”, passively awaiting their climate fate**. The possibilities of human agency are relegated to footnotes, the changing cultural norms and practices made invisible, the creative potential of the human imagination ignored.

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**Footnoting DA**

**Der Derian 95** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

**The permutation engages security through a political telos – blocks off critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

**Environment Link**

**a. Securitization undermines cooperation – turns the case**

**Trombetta 8** (Maria Julia Trombetta, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures, Delft University of Technology; “Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse,” Outh Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008)

Opponents were quick to warn that the term 'security' **evokes a set of confrontational practices** associated with the state and the military which **should be kept apart from the environmental debate** (Deudney 1990). Concerns included the possibilities of **creating new competencies for the military—militarizing the environment rather than greening security** (Kakonen 1994)—or the rise of **nationalistic attitudes** in order to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466-468). Deudney argued that not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also **introduce a zero-sum rationality** to the environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and **undermine the cooperative efforts**

required by environmental problems. Similar objections came from a southern perspective: environmental security was perceived as a discourse about the security of northern countries, their **access to resources** and the **protection of their patterns of consumption** (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue (United Nations Security Council 2007).

The divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental security by arguing that the logic of security is fixed and inflexible and those who support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed distracts attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the literature there is a debate about whether and how **security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue**—the debate focuses 'on the implications of using security language for the definition and governance of migration and the environment' (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security. This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to explore 'what the practices of definition and usage do to a concept, and what the concept in turn does to the world into which it is inscribed' (Bartelson 2000,182). To undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about environmental and climate security have developed and **'conditioned the possibility of thought and action'** (181).

The article is presented in three parts. The first explores why the environment has been excluded from security considerations. By adopting a perspective that is **attentive to the social construction of security issues** and its implications, the article assesses the potential of a **discursive approach in transforming existing security practices**. The analysis draws on the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School (inter alia Buzan and Waever 1998) and integrates it with elements borrowed from Beck's work (inter alia 1992, 1999, 2006) on risk society to provide a framework that accounts for transformation. It argues that the securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices. The second and third parts apply this framework to explore the development of environmental security and climate security discourses respectively.

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